Severe water pollution is among the top policy priorities in both China and India. This paper undertakes a comparative case analysis to examine efforts in combating river pollution in two major rivers -the Yangtze in China and the Ganga in India. Our analysis suggests that efforts in combating river pollution in the two Asian giants have encountered substantial challenges, such as the lack of comprehensive legal mechanisms to control pollution at the basin level, the lack of coordination among multiple government agencies, and significant gaps in policy implementation. Our analysis also points out considerable differences between China and India in institutional structure, regulatory approaches and policy instruments in dealing with river pollution.
Introduction
The Indian economy has experienced unprecedented growth in the last decade. India's gross domestic product (GDP) grew to US$2.3 trillion (10'China's water environment had reached a state of unprecedented pollution crisis… most river reaches of the Huai, Hai and Liao rivers basins were classified as Category V 1 or worse in water quality… 60% of the water body in Songhua, Huai, Hai, Liao river basins and Tai, Dian and Chao lakes were rated Category IV or worse' (Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China (MEPPRC), 2010).
Yet there are considerable variations in pollution levels among the seven major river basins in China, namely the Yangtze River, Yellow River, Huai River, Hai River, Songhua River, Liao River, and Zhu (Pearl) River (MEPPRC, 2015) . Table 1 shows the pollution levels in the seven basins from 1999 to 2013. While the proportion of stream segments with water quality measured at Category III and better in the Yangtze River basin remained higher than other basins, water quality deteriorated considerably from 79.2% in 1999 to 63.7% in 2009 before some improvements were observed in recent years. Tai Lake basin suffers from the worst water pollution; the proportion of stream segments with water quality measured at Category III and better ranged from 6.5% to 19.9% between 1999 and 2013. South-western China (2011 -2013 ; Water Resources Bulletin for Tai Lake Basin and River Basins in Southeastern China (2011 -2013 ; Water Resources Bulletin for Pearl River Basin (2011 Basin ( -2012 .
Meanwhile, river pollution outbreaks, such as the Songhua River water pollution incident at the end of 2005, and numerous blue-green algae outbreaks in Taihu, Dianchi, and Chaohu Lakes since the beginning of the summer of 2007, have become more frequent and more widespread, suggesting that water pollution in China remains a grave concern (Wang, 2007) .
There is no doubt that population growth, economic development and urbanization will continue to impose significant challenges on efforts to control river pollution in China in the future. Among the three major pollution sources -industrial pollution, agricultural pollution, and domestic pollutionthe discharge and load of urban domestic sewage have increased rapidly with the increase in population (Wen & Liu, 2014) . The total sewage discharge in China almost doubled between 1989 and 2013, to 69.54 billion (10 9 ) tons (Wen & Liu, 2014) , and showed no sign of decline. The institutional arrangement for river pollution control in China is highly complex, as multiple ministries and government agencies at different levels are involved. The departments of environmental protection at different levels of government are the main authorities over water pollution control, while the central Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) is in charge of assessing pollutant carrying capacity for different river basins, setting the limit on total pollutant amount, and monitoring water quantity and quality of rivers and lakes. Other entities, such as the Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Land and Resources, also have various roles to play in controlling river pollution.
So far there has been no unified water pollution management system in China, as each of China's seven major river basins is governed by a separate river basin management authority (Wang & Wu, 2012) . Water resources protection bureaus have been established for all seven major rivers for water pollution control in the respective river basins. The MEP has also set up six regional environmental supervision centers from 2006 to strengthen the management and coordination of cross-regional river-basin environmental affairs. China's current structure of water pollution management in the seven major river basins is shown in Figure 1 .
China's current institutional structure for river pollution control has several major shortcomings. First of all, the environmental protection departments, the primary agencies responsible for river pollution control, do not possess administrative authority to carry out their mandates, imposing significant challenges for policy implementation (Wang & Wu, 2013) . In addition, coordination among various agencies presents another major problem in pollution control: as each agency or authority is tasked to serve a single function, it is difficult to undertake tasks involving a high degree of coordination across agencies (Deng & Huang, 2003) . Last, local governments are responsible for controlling the water quality of the river basins under their jurisdictions, but they are often preoccupied with other (potentially) conflicting objectives, such as employment and economic development, and often choose to take a lenient approach towards polluting enterprises in order to promote economic growth (Yang et al., 2013) .
India
Despite the heightened public attention brought about by national initiatives such as 'Clean Ganga Mission', river pollution in India has worsened in recent years. The latest water quality reports from the CPCB suggest that nearly 12,363 kilometres of river stretches nationwide fail to meet water quality standards ( Table 2 ), and that approximately 39% of the total inland river system has been classified under priorities I-III, the worst category in water quality (CPCB, 2015b) .
A more alarming trend is that, by almost all counts, pollution levels have gone up rapidly since 2009. From 2009 to 2015, the number of polluted river stretches doubled from 150 to 302, while the urban sewage generated increased from 38,000 MLD in 2009 to 57,000 MLD in 2015 (Vashishtha, 2015) . Meanwhile, due to inadequate treatment capacity, nearly 70% of the wastewater generated in the country is dumped untreated into various water bodies (Table 3 ). The situation in rural areas has also deteriorated considerably, and only 3.15% of the rural population has access to proper sanitation services (Murty & Kumar, 2011) .
The agricultural sector is one of the biggest contributors to river pollution in the country. Massive amounts of fertilizers and pesticides used in fields are often washed off to adjoining water bodies, leading to excessive nutritional enrichment of water bodies, eutrophication, proliferation of algal blooms, sedimentation and elimination of native species. India's pesticide consumption level today, around 45,000 tons in the year 2012-13, is still relatively low compared to China (Krishi Jagran website), and there is potential for significant increases in the near future. While India's recent economic growth has led to severe river pollution, the scale of efforts required for combating such pollution has not been adequately reflected in government expenditure. According Table 2 . Total length of polluted rivers under various categories (CPCB, 2015b) in India. to the Outcome Budget 2014 -15 (MoWR, 2015 , the budget allocated to river basin management and renovation is approximately 34 billion ( 10 9 ) INR, a mere 0.02% of the nation's GDP. It is unlikely that such meagre investment can successfully halt the drastic deterioration of the nation's aquatic environment.
The Indian legal system is also not adequately equipped to effectively handle cases of transgression of existing laws on river pollution, such as the Water Act (1974), the Water Cess Act (1977 and 1988) , and the Environment Protection Act or EPA (1986), to name a few. These laws only cover water pollution from industrial sources, while pollution control for domestic or agricultural sectors is governed by Minimal National Standards (MINAS). There are no specific standards of monitoring for pollution resulting from runoffs from industry, mines or agricultural fields.
The overlap and ambiguous responsibilities of multiple agencies involved in dealing with river pollution further complicate the problem (Figure 2 Note: Class I cities are those with more than 100,000 population, while Class II towns have population between 50,000 and 100,000. Source: CPCB (2009). of Shipping, Ministry of Health and Family Development, Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Tourism, also share responsibilities over the water sector. Each of these agencies have their own mandates, preferences, and interests in dealing with river pollution. For example, CPCB, the primary pollution monitoring body, is placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Climate Change, and its main responsibilities include preventing, monitoring and controlling water and air quality, as well as coordinating activities among state pollution control boards and advising respective state governments. Other organizations, however, such as the National River Conservation Directorate (NRCD), the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG), the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) and various research institutes (all under MoWR), are also given responsibilities to look after overall or region-specific management of river basins and groundwater resources.
Unlike China, India does not have any separate river basin authorities for individual river basinswith the exception of the National River Ganga, for which NMCG was established to coordinate activities of the regional state agencies. NRCD is the central organization responsible for management and rejuvenation of all river basins. Unfortunately, both NRCD and NMCG only play an advisory role, with no authoritative jurisdiction over pollution control.
The exclusive power of states in governing water resources presents another challenge for adopting a more integrated approach to river pollution in India. Entry 17 of the State List in the Constitution clearly states that 'water is a state subject. States have the exclusive power to regulate water supplies, irrigation canals, drainage and embankments, water storage, water power and fisheries' (Dellapenna & Gupta, 2009 ).
Combating river pollution in the Yangtze and the Ganga

Yangtze River basin
The Yangtze River originates from the Tanggula Mountains of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, and its main stream flows from west to east, passing through 11 provinces in China. Measured at 6,300 kilometres, the Yangtze is the third longest river in the world, only shorter than the Nile in Africa and the Amazon in South America. It is the largest river basin in China, accounting for 36% of the country's total runoff volume. Its catchment area, covering 1.8 million square kilometres, is about one fifth of China's land area (Liu & Li, 2015; Zhang, 2015) .
The Yangtze River basin is densely populated, with a population equivalent to 39% of China's total population (Tian et al., 2011; Liu & Li, 2015) . Water consumption in the Yangtze River basin accounts for one third of China's total water consumption, and the sewage discharge in the basin accounts for nearly half of China's total sewage discharge. Thus the protection of water resources in the Yangtze River basin is of strategic significance not only for the Yangtze River Economic Zone but also for the Chinese economy as a whole (Li et al., 2012) .
The overall water quality of the Yangtze River basin deteriorated considerably prior to 2010, but some improvements have been observed since then. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of river stretches in the Yangtze River basin with water quality categorized Category I to Category III decreased from 81.2% to 63.7% from 1998 to 2009, but rose to 74.4% by 2013.
However, some areas of the Yangtze River basin remain severely polluted. For example, the Three Gorges Reservoir section at the upper reaches of the Yangtze River main stream and the urban sections at the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River main stream are heavily polluted. Severe pollution South-western China (1998 -2013 problems have also persisted in External Qinhuai River, Huangpu River, and Gan River in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River basin and the Xiang River basin due to heavy metal contamination.
More importantly, pollution in the Yangtze River imposes significant threats to drinking water safety as the basin is densely populated. For example, because both water intake and sewage discharge are mainly performed at river banks in the urban sections of the Yangtze River main stream, the safety of drinking water sources is at risk (Weng et al., 2011) . In fact, there are more than 500 water intakes along the Yangtze River main stream, and all of them have been exposed to pollution to varying degrees, posing a potential threat to the safety of drinking water.
Since the 1990s, water pollution in the Yangtze River has been a top priority for the Chinese government, and various policy measures have been taken by government agencies at different levels. Early efforts were focused on establishing a water quality monitoring system. Since 1998, the Water Resources Protection Bureau of the Yangtze River has monitored the water quality of water bodies at provincial boundaries in the Yangtze River basin, and a bulletin on the water quality of water bodies at provincial boundaries has been released monthly. In addition, a comprehensive monitoring system, including a river basin center, eight river basin branch centers, 10 provincial centers (working on the regions in the Yangtze River basin), 79 prefecture-level branch centers, and more than 1,300 monitoring stations (including the stations for rivers in south-western China), has been established to cover all the surface bodies of water in the river basin (Hollert, 2013) .
Planning has also played a key role. In 2000, the Yangtze River Conservancy Commission began the planning of water resources protection at the basin level. In 2010, the Comprehensive Plan of Water Resources in Yangtze River Basin was approved by national authorities, followed by the Comprehensive Plan for Yangtze River Basin (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) (2021) (2022) (2023) (2024) (2025) (2026) (2027) (2028) (2029) (2030) in 2012, and the Action Plan for Water Pollution Prevention and Control in 2015. These plans specify detailed targets for pollution reduction, along with policy measures and tasks to achieve them. For example, the Action Plan for Water Pollution Prevention and Control stipulates that the proportion of rivers with good water quality (Category I-III) in the Yangtze River basin shall reach or exceed 70% by 2020. Once the plans are approved, the fulfillment of the targets becomes an important aspect in evaluating the performance of government agencies.
A variety of policy instruments have been implemented at different segments of the Yangtze River. First of all, regulation on the basis of total quantity of pollutants has been introduced in areas where regulation based on pollutant concentration failed to improve water quality. Under such regulation, the total quantity of pollutants is capped at the sub-basin level, and the detailed performance targets are passed down through the administrative ladder. In recent years, the applications of such regulation have been extended from quantity of pollutant discharged to quantity of water intake.
In addition, a pollution permit system has been introduced as a part of the total quantity-based regulation. In the Three Gorges Reservoir region, for example, all units discharging pollutants into river bodies in accordance with the standards and other regulations must obtain pollutant discharge permits. In July 2010, Zhejiang Province implemented a pollutant permit system with two types of pollutant permits: Class A permits, based on total quantity, and Class B, based on pollutant concentration.
China has also experimented with market-based instruments, such as a levy system and pollution rights trading. In 2009, the Environmental Protection Department of Jiangsu Province issued Provisional Regulations on Levying Pollution Charges Based on Total Discharge of Water Pollutants, which stipulated that 'pollution charges shall be levied on industrial enterprises located in Yangtze River basin if their water pollutant discharges exceed the standards.' Pilot projects have also been conducted to establish a pollution rights trading system. At the end of 2008, Jiangsu Province carried out a pilot program of paid use and trading of pollution rights for major water pollutants in Tai Lake basin. The fee for pollution rights collected in 2009 totaled 77.394 million Yuan (Zhang et al., 2016) .
These efforts have resulted in noticeable progress in combating pollution in the Yangtze River basin. For example, chemical oxygen demand (COD) discharge was reduced from 5.084 million tons in 1995 to 4.26 million tons in 2010, and industrial COD discharge decreased from 1.36 million tons in 2005 to 1.21 million tons in 2010 (Miao et al., 2015; Yan & Liu, 2015) . Yet sewage discharge continued to rise, from 23.4 billion (10 9 ) tons in 2000 to 29.6 billion ( 10 9 ) tons in 2005, and 33.9 billion (10 9 ) tons in 2010 ( Jin et al., 2014; Wen & Liu, 2014) .
Future efforts in combating water pollution in the Yangtze River basin, however, may be undermined by several weaknesses in the system of water governance. First of all, while numerous regulations and measures have been carried out by different agencies, so far there is no single law governing water pollution prevention and control in the Yangtze. There is an urgent need to enact the Yangtze River Law and other related laws to clarify the roles, responsibilities, legal rights, and enforcement mechanisms of the different agencies involved in dealing with water pollution in the Yangtze River basin. Second, there is very little coordination among different levels of government and across different agencies. The main responsibilities for environmental protection of river basins are borne by local governments, but various other agencies, such as water resources departments, environmental protection departments, health departments, shipping departments, and port supervision departments (maritime affairs), among others, also have jurisdiction over water resources management. This imposes a significant challenge for adopting basin-wide and comprehensive water resource management for the entire basin. Third, while the government has devoted considerable attention to water pollution in the Yangtze, the involvement of non-state actors, such as private sector players and communities, has been limited.
Ganga River basin
The Gangetic plain, spreading across 1,086,000 square kilometres over India, Nepal and Bangladesh, is one of the largest and most populated river basins in the world. Measured at a mean annual water discharge of 18,700 m 3 /sec, the Ganga River is the fifth largest in the world (Sanghi & Kaushal, 2014) . Fed by a complex interplay of glacial waters, surface flows, seasonal monsoon and groundwater resources, the Ganga has significant economic, cultural, social and religious importance for more than 500 million inhabitants in the basin.
The Ganga flows through five Indian states -Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal -before draining into the Bay of Bengal via Bangladesh. It is the most water-rich basin in the country, accounting for more than 25% of India's land area, 28% of the country's total surface and groundwater, and approximately 16% of the country's sewage discharge (GRBEMP Interim Report, 2013; CPCB, 2013) . The Ganga River Basin (GRB) supports nearly 43% of India's population and contributes to 19% of its GDP.
The pollution level of the Ganga River has reached a critical stage (CPCB, 2013) . Cities along the river -36 Class I cities and 14 Class II towns -are discharging approximately 2,723 MLD of urban wastewater/sewage, yet the treatment capacity based on installed sewage treatment plants (STPs) is merely 1,208 MLD (Table 4 ). In addition, 6,087 MLD of open drain water (a mix of storm water, runoff from fields, and solid waste disposal dumpsites, industrial wastewater and sewage) flows into the river.
The CPCB report also identified 764 polluting industries on the track of the river (CPCB, 2013). Tannery industries are one of the largest contributors to pollution, followed by the paper and pulp, chemical, sugar, and textile industries. In addition, cities like Delhi, Kolkata, Hardwar, Varanasi, Allahabad, Kannauj, Kanpur, Patna and many more adjoining the river consume massive amounts of water, while dumping back substantial volumes of wastewater into the river untreated.
The perennial flow of the river is limited by excessive blockages and withdrawals upstream resulting from barrages, hydropower projects and irrigation canals, which further aggravates the pollution problems. In addition, the sediment load carried by the Ganga is one of the highest in the world, ranging from 1,085 to 2,400 million tons annually (Das, 2014) . The CPCB warns that, even if 100% of the sewage is treated before discharge, the water of the Ganga cannot be restored to bathing quality level in dry seasons under such conditions (CPCB, 2013) .
The first Ganga conservation project, GAP I, was launched in 1985 under the leadership of then Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, to deal with water pollution. The project was initially expected to be completed in five years, but the Indian government extended it to 2000, after realizing the enormity of the problem. Dubbed GAP Phase I, the project was later joined by GAP Phase II to cover those tributaries and cities exempted under GAP Phase I, and GAP II to cover the Yamuna, Damodar and Gomati rivers and the big cities along these tributaries. Unfortunately, however, little progress has been made in reducing water pollution in the Ganga despite all these efforts (CAG, 2000; Murty & Shunglu, 2000) .
Efforts in pollution abatement in the Ganga slowly faded out after 2000 as GAP officially ended, while the level of activities along the river intensified due to urbanization and economic development, giving rise to further deterioration of water quality. As the situation reached a crisis point, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Sankat Mochan Foundation (Varanasi) and Eco-friends (Kanpur), along with environmentalists, religious leaders, and international agencies, became actively involved in bringing the environmental crisis in the Ganga to the national policy agenda through awareness campaigns, road shows, clean-up activities and public litigation (Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012) .
In 2008, the Ganga was given the status of a 'National River' and the National Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA) was formed under the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF, 2016) . The NGRBA serves as an advisory body to the government to coalesce available data, and technical and policy expertise and assist the government in implementing an integrated river basin management plan. In 2014, a change in national politics brought back Ganga clean-up to the national agenda after Prime Minister Modi took office. The NGRBA was merged into the MWR to become the MWR, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, and a new platform named 'Namami Gange' was launched for the coordination of multiple ministries with mandates on Ganga clean-up.
Meanwhile, the government has stepped up regulatory control over water resources development in the Ganga. The MWR, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation issued an official statement in June 2015 that dam projects over the River Ganga would no longer be sanctioned unless it is proven that they would not compromise the ecological flow of the river (The Times of India, June 2015). To control indiscriminate dumping of sewage to the river or its tributaries, numerous STPs have been approved by the government, in phases, for major cities along the basin. Around 1,600 villages located along the Ganga have been selected to participate in the Ganga Gram Programme, under which each village will be provided with 10 million INR from the central government to develop proper waste and sewage treatment facilities based on a community-driven model (Press Information Bureau, Gov. of India). In order to generate data for monitoring water quality, 113 real-time monitoring stations along with bio-monitoring facilities are being developed at various crucial points along the river (MOEF, 2016). Community-led monitoring has been proposed for remote areas where monitoring centers are not present. The Army has also been roped in to form a 'Ganga Task Force' to ensure that no public or private entity is allowed to pollute the river or its banks, and the first team has already been deployed since January 2016. It is expected that such Ganga Task Force companies will be deployed to all key places, such as Kanpur, Varanasi, and Allahabad, to stop polluters as well as to raise awareness among the general public (Press Information Bureau, Gov. of India).
National Green Tribunal (NGT), created by the Indian government in 2010 for addressing environment-related cases on an expedited basis, has taken a special interest in hearings related to water pollution in the Ganga River. NGT strictly prohibits the use of plastic and dumping of domestic sewage or other wastes by hotels or other urban bodies alongside the river (The Hindu, 2015) , and NGT has issued notices of closure to hotels and industries not conforming to pollution norms along the banks of the Ganga. Positive changes have occurred in recent years. For example, many new riverfront development programs have been completed, enabling the public to enjoy and interact with the river while appreciating the clean environment there.
However, considerable challenges remain for the 'Clean Ganga Mission.' First, there is no separate legislation governing river pollution prevention and control for the Ganga. The mainstream river has received substantial attention for clean-up, discharge norms and rejuvenation projects, but its tributaries, which also contribute significantly to the river system's pollution, have been largely left out.
In addition, although a large number of STPs have been approved, and the capital expenditure (CAPEX) for these plants is taken care of by the central government, the strategies for paying operational and management (O&M) expenses are not yet clearly laid out. Without a viable plan for O&M, STPs will not be able to sustain in the long term.
Last, although the main function of 'Namami Gange' is the coordination of various stakeholders, state governments and government agencies to facilitate basin-wide integrated water resources management, much more coordination and sharing of information among states are needed for long-term success. As of now, state governments are still working as separate agencies in dealing with issues arising from various sections of the river basin, leaving insufficient scope for cross-communication of information and experience sharing.
Comparative analysis
In this section, we compare India and China's policy measures and governance for combating river pollution to identify areas of similarities and differences between the two countries. Our comparative analysis will focus on institutional structures, regulatory approaches, and policy instruments in combating river pollution in the two countries.
From the perspective of institutional structure, in both India and China, multiple agencies at the national and local levels are involved in river pollution control, and the lack of coordination among these agencies presents significant challenges. In China, the potential areas of conflict are between national and local governments, and among different local governments. In India, the potential areas of conflict are among different central government agencies with overlapping responsibilities in river pollution control. The implementing agencies at the local (state or regional) level lack ownership or accountability for the programs.
Despite these similarities, there are several critical differences between the two countries in terms of institutional arrangements. First of all, the water resources for river basins in China fall under the jurisdiction of the national government agencies, while in India the management of water resources is a state matter. As a result, the central government agencies in India, such as NMCG, NRCD, and CPCB, only play an advisory and monitoring role in pollution control, while in China the national government agencies have both the mandate and the resources to regulate and manage water resources and control pollution. Second, local governments in China are bound to carry out the decisions made by the national government through individual departments and bureaus found at different levels of local governments. In contrast, the Indian state governments are more independent and are entitled to legal rights over river resources, but have neither the funds nor the willingness to carry out pollution reduction programs. Third, there is significant involvement of non-state actors such as local communities and NGOs in India; in China, the participation of non-state actors is still limited, and river pollution control is mainly dependent on the government.
There are also considerable differences in terms of regulatory approaches to river pollution between the two countries. Although both countries are yet to enact laws governing particular river basins, India has already developed an array of laws pertaining to river pollution and control. In China, in contrast, the emphasis has been on administrative measures rather than legal approaches. At the same time, however, the existence of relevant laws in India does not mean that they are being implemented properly. The difficulties in implementation in India are further exacerbated by the fact that the national government does not have regulatory authority over water resources. Another key difference between the two countries is the effort taken to monitor and measure water quality. In the Yangtze River, for example, the efforts in monitoring have been extensive. The monitoring system includes one basin level center, 8 branch centers, 10 provincial centers, 79 prefecture-level centers, and 1,300 monitoring stations as mentioned above. In comparison, there are only 113 monitoring stations along the Ganga. The lack of monitoring facilities will present significant challenges for India to improve the regulatory effectiveness of the country in dealing with river pollution. This gap between the two countries may in part reflect the difference in resources invested and financial capacity, as the economic development level in China is higher than India, with a per capita GNI (gross national income) of $7,400 in 2014, compared to $1,570 in India (The World Bank, 2016).
The two countries also differ considerably from each other in the use of policy instruments in river pollution control. In China, while command-and-control regulation continues to be the dominant instrument, several other instruments, such as market-based instruments, have also been applied. The system of total quantity control has been applied extensively in recent years, and other instruments, such as permit systems for pollutant discharge, levy systems for water pollutant discharge, and pollution rights trading systems, have been applied to varying degrees. In India, pollution control has focused mostly on treatment of wastewater and, more recently, on penalizing noncompliant agencies; policy instruments aiming to reduce pollution and discharge are rarely used.
Concluding remarks
Attempts to compare water resources management between China and India may be overshadowed by apparent differences in the countries' differing institutional structures, which are deeply rooted in their respective political systems. Indeed, such institutional differences have profound impacts on the effectiveness of water governance in combating river pollution. For instance, central government agencies in India do not have regulatory authority and thus they can only play an advisory role, while state governments in India have the legal authority for dealing with river pollution but lack the resources to carry out their mandates. In China, in contrast, tasks such as legal authorizing, operational financing and strategic planning in tackling river pollution are carried out by the central government. The Chinese government has made a sustained effort to combat river pollution over a long period of time, while India's river clean-up efforts have fluctuated and been affected by the changes in national politics.
Our comparative analysis suggests that there are critical differences between China and India beyond the political systems of the two countries, potentially offering more useful lessons for both countries as well as for other developing countries confronting river pollution problems. First, while the availability of financial resources undoubtedly plays a key role in dealing with river pollution, since water infrastructure development tends to be capital intensive, the quality of water governance plays an equally important role. For example, comprehensive planning and regulation over total quantity of pollutants are among the key contributing factors in the improvement of water quality in the Yangtze. Such effective management is attributed to a centralized water governance system that assists with long-term, cross-region and capital intensive projects.
Another critical factor is effectiveness in policy implementation. For example, the existence of relevant laws in India does not mean that they are being implemented, as is indicated from failures of GAP in the last three decades. Adequate resources and appropriate incentive structures are key to effective implementation. In comparison to India, China's success in reversing the trend in water pollution in the Yangtze in recent years can be in part attributed to the linkage of the fulfilment of targets in river pollution control and the performance measurement of government agencies and local government leaders.
Lastly, extensive efforts in monitoring water quality are the foundation for the application of many different regulatory approaches and policy instruments. For example, a Pollutant Permit System will not be very effective in regulating the behavior of polluting industries unless a reliable and credible water quality monitoring system is in place.
Our comparative analysis also offers several concrete lessons for policy makers in India and China in combating river pollution. In India, more emphasis should be placed on various policy instruments that go beyond wastewater treatment, and strict regulatory measures in reducing river pollution should be taken into consideration. In addition, the costs of combating river pollution should not be underestimated. The annual budget allocated to wastewater treatment in India was merely 0.02% of GDP in 2014-15, grossly inadequate given the daunting challenges. The central government agencies in India that are responsible for river pollution control should seek to exercise greater power over national regulatory decisions as well as to enhance their legal status in governing water matters.
For policy-makers in China, more attention can be focused on establishing a basin-wide approach to river pollution problems and enacting laws governing river pollution for specific river basins. Efforts should also be made to more extensively engage non-state actors in combating river pollution in areas such as financing infrastructural development and public participation in decision making, monitoring and policy formulation.
